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FOREWORD
Education in strategy is feasible and important.
Few are the would-be strategists who are beyond
improvement by some formal education. However, for
such education to be well directed, it needs to rest upon
sound assumptions concerning the eternal nature,
meaning, and function, yet ever shifting character
of strategy, and the range of behaviors required for
effective strategic performance. This monograph
strives to shed light on these fundamental matters.
Dr. Gray emphasizes the necessity for strategic
education to help develop the strategic approach, the
way of thinking that can solve or illuminate strategic
problems. He advises that such education should not
strive for a spurious relevance by presenting a military
variant of current affairs. Also, the strategist will
perform better for today if he has mastered and can
employ strategy’s general theory.
The monograph is relatively optimistic, in that it
argues the case for strategy being both possible and, in
some helpful measure, teachable.

		
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Because strategic performance must involve the
ability to decide, to command, and to lead, as well as
the capacity to understand, there are practical limits to
what is feasible and useful by way of formal education
in strategy. The soldier who best comprehends what
Sun-tzu, Clausewitz, and Thucydides intended to say,
is not necessarily the soldier best fitted to strategic
high command. It is important to distinguish between
intellect and character/personality. The superior strategist is ever uniquely a product of nature/biology,
personality/psychology, and experience/opportunity.
Nonetheless, formal education has its place.
Strategic genius is rare, strategic talent is more
common, though still unusual. The latter can be
improved by formal education, the former most
probably cannot. However, there is merit in the
educational aspiration to help educate instinct for a
better performance.
It is fortunate that genius is not strictly required in
our strategists since education is apt to be unable to
reach it. What we do require is competence based on
a talent that can be educated. There is no denying that
because strategy is a pragmatic creative activity, the
strategist—well-educated or not in a formal sense—
ideally has to know what to do, how to do it, and, last
but not least, he/she needs to be able to do it. Obviously, biology and psychology shaped by the opportunities
granted by experience loom large here. Professors of
Strategy cannot so teach their military students that
they are truly fit for purpose as strategists-in-action.
But professors can help educate the strategic judgment
of those soldiers and civilians who are educable.
Because it is a practical real-world endeavor, strategy and its strategists do not have to secure a grade
v

of excellence, though that certainly is right as the
ambition. By its very nature, our strategy has to be
good enough to compete with the enemy’s strategy,
in the whole strategic context. By that, I mean that
even if strategy is relatively uninspired, so complex
is competition and war that fungibility may save us.
Our generals, or troops, or equipment, or tactics might
be less than stellar, but somewhere amidst the myriad
facets of statecraft, war, and warfare, we might be able
to locate and exploit compensating advantages.
Although the classroom (of several kinds) cannot
put in what God and nature omitted, it does not
follow that strategy cannot be taught to good effect.
Any strategically educable person should have their
capacity for sound and perhaps superior strategic
judgment improved by intense exposure to the small
canon of classic texts on general strategic theory. Even
though personal experience is the finest teacher, there
should be no denying the value in consideration of the
wisdom distilled from lifelong learning by the greatest
strategic minds of all time. If one is unable to profit as
a strategist from careful study of Sun-tzu, Thucydides,
Clausewitz, and Edward N. Luttwak, then one should
not aspire to the strategic baton—unless one truly is a
genius, of course.
The strategic educator seeks to assist the student
in his ability to think strategically. He has to help
hone performance of the strategic function which
obligates a coherent meshing of ends, ways, and
means. All too often it is popular to teach strategy
only with empirical reference to our contemporary
and anticipated near-future challenges. This is
understandable but nonetheless is an error. Strategic
studies worthy of the name can degenerate into a
professionally narrowly competent variant of current
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affairs. The students initially value what they see as
high personal relevance in the strategic problems of
today, but that very relevance is likely to shape and
bias their analysis. Because strategy and its function
is eternal and universal, there is much to be said for
taking students out of their contemporary comfort zone
of familiar detail and instead obliging them to reason
strategically for different times and places. The basic
problems will be discovered to be startlingly similar.
The strategic educator does not seek to develop experts
on the strategic issues of the early 21st century. Rather
he strives to educate aspiring strategists in the ability
to think strategically and exercise strategic judgment.
Indispensable to an education in strategy is recognition of strategy’s limits. Strategic performance
requires a tactical competence by its sword arm that
it cannot always assume. Similarly, and as much
to the point, the prospects for a superior strategic
performance must be impacted massively by the
wisdom or otherwise in the politics-as-policy that
turns the official key for action and propels it. The
strategist has to devise and execute plans (theories)
for military behavior that should advance and perhaps
secure the goals specified by policy. But those goals can
be ill chosen, and they vary with political mood and
circumstance. It is the duty of the strategist to try to
match purposeful military effort and its consequences
with the country’s political interests expressed as
policy. This can be a mission of heroic difficulty, even
to the point of impossibility.
One reason why strategic performance can be
poor is because senior military strategists may prove
unable to communicate effectively on military realities
to professional politicians who do not want to be told
what most probably cannot be done, and therefore
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should not be attempted. While it is the duty of policy
to listen to, and conduct genuine dialog with military
expertise, it is the duty of the military profession so to
educate its senior strategists that such a dialog worthy
of the name is possible. A well-educated strategist is
a person who is educated in more than strategy. A
liberal education in the classical sense must be helpful
to the human performance that is a key enabler of high
quality in national strategic performance.
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SCHOOLS FOR STRATEGY:
TEACHING STRATEGY FOR 21ST CENTURY
CONFLICT
Caesar was a soldiers’ general, but he thought beyond
his soldiers. Here the matter may be left. The art of war
under the Roman Republic was something that belonged
at Rome, a plant that grew in Roman soil, something
which needed for its application talent not genius, but
in its culmination, it did produce a soldier greater than
itself, a soldier in whom there was that fusing together of
intellect and will that marks off genius from talent [i.e.,
Caesar].
F. E. Adcock, 19401
In a 1973 book on grand strategy, defense specialist John
Collins observed that while “strategy is a game that
anyone can play, it is not a game that just anyone can
play well. Only the most gifted participants have much
chance to win a prize….”
Individuals either have the cognitive skills for strategy
or they do not, and Collins’ observation, based on years
of experience with National War College graduates,
is most do not—not even among field-grade military
officers with the potential for flag rank. There is scant
evidence to date that professional education or training
are at all successful in inculcating strategic insight into
most individuals. Instead, the best we can do is to try to
identify those individuals who have this talent and then
make sure that they are put in positions in which they
can use it to good effect.
		
Andrew F. Krepinevich and
Barry D. Watts, 2009;
John Collins, 19732
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Introduction: Issues.
The difference between talent and genius is the difference between, respectively, Dwight D. Eisenhower
and Omar Bradley on the one hand, and George S.
Patton on the other. An education in strategy cannot
close the gap between the two categories, no matter
what theory for tailored improvement is favored. No
syllabus, theoretical or practical, can insert what God
and biology fail to provide. So much for some of the
bad news. The better news is that talent typically is
good enough to get the strategy job done. This talent
needs only to be sufficient to outstrategize the enemy’s
strategist(s), always assuming that the villain of the
day does not enjoy some major structural advantage
in conflict. If that should be the case, then one has need
of superior strategic skill, indeed possibly of genius,
to offset (and more) the unfriendly material, or other,
imbalance. The Thirteen Colonies needed superior
strategy, as did the Confederate States of America.
The former were suitably blessed, the latter were well
blessed, but insufficiently so. It should be needless to
add that the quality of strategy one requires depends
nontrivially upon the quality and quantity of the enemy
as adaptive competitor in purposeful violence. In John
Collins’ apt words, “[s]trategy is not a game that states
can play by themselves.”3
There are nearly always severe problems with
strategic genius, and the downside, alas, is inseparable
from the upside. The qualities that make vitally for
genius in a strategist are, unfortunately, supported
and possibly even enabled by such undesirable
characteristics of personality as a monstrously large
ego, intolerance of criticism, a problem with delegation, a thoroughly self-regarding life-style, a gigantic
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ambition, and a tendency to overconfidence. These are
heavy burdens for genius to bear, but some or all of
them are virtually unavoidable if genius is permitted
to do its thing. It is almost unnecessary to mention that
strategic genius, cursed inalienably with the potent
virus that matures into the Great Person Syndrome,
understandably is found offensive by career wouldbe rivals, as well as by the unfortunates who have
to service the often extraordinary habits of the Great
Person in question.
The epigraphs and opening paragraphs to this
monograph have emphasized the all too human
dimension to strategy. Our subject may be the
teaching of strategy, but history and logic both should
be allowed to tell us that bringing horses to water
guarantees neither that they will drink, nor that they
will be able to benefit adequately even if they do. The
epigraphs were chosen because they highlight master
themes for this narrative. They claim that strategic
talent can be distinguished from strategic genius; that
strategic genius is exceedingly rare; and that even mere
competence in strategy, simply some talent, is unusual.
Plainly, on these summary assessments, strategy is
strictly a super-elite set of behaviors accessible for
performance only by few people. This is probably
true, at least it sounds plausible. Whether or not this
plausible claim can withstand critical scrutiny remains
to be determined. Moreover, it may prove to be the
case that strategic genius and strategic competence
comprise well enough a linear spectrum, not two
distinct categories rigidly separated by a chasm that
enforces discontinuity. Genius overall, in common with
the physical and moral courage of which it is partially
made, may sensibly be seen to be episodic rather than
systematically permanent. In other words, genius can
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have a bad day, or at least an off day when it is merely
competent, or occasionally much worse. For example,
there can be little doubt that Lee was not at his best
on Day 3 at Gettysburg, while Napoleon demonstrated
scant excellence in generalship on the day of the battle
at Waterloo.4
Although we must discuss the substance of strategy,
what it is that should be taught, it is no less important
that we consider the students of strategic education:
Who are they? What do they need to be able to do?
What can, and what most probably can they not, be
taught? A discussion like this has no merit, in fact
it can only confuse, if the key terms are not defined
early and employed subsequently with consistency.
Unfortunately, few subjects of deep concern to the
U.S. defense community are harassed by so much misunderstanding as is debate over all matters deemed
“strategic.” This monograph, therefore, must begin
with clarification of the conceptual fundamentals.
Subsequently, the story arc proceeds to consider the
historical context for strategy in the 21st century;
approaches to the teaching of strategy; and the desirable
content of strategic education. The initial step in the
journey has to be specification of exactly what is, and is
not, encompassed by the concept of strategy, and just
what does, and what does not, warrant qualification
by the powerful adjective, “strategic.”
The Nature and Character of Strategy:
Fundamentals.
It is noticeable how often a profound understanding
of a subject is advanced by trinitarian theorizing.
The deepest of Thucydides’ compound insights unarguably is his identification of the prime motives
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both in decisions for war and in statecraft broadly in
the oft-quoted triptych of “fear, honor, and interest.”5
Carl von Clausewitz corralled his somewhat rebellious
ingredients of war into his preferred “wondrous
trinity,” consisting of passion and violence; chance,
opportunity, and uncertainty; and reason in policy.6
Properly approached, strategy needs to be understood
within the triadic framework of ends, ways, and means.
However, the actual complex balance of relative weight
among the three fundamental elements of strategy will
vary hugely from occasion to occasion.
Lest readers regard this section of the monograph
as an academician’s diversion from the real subject, I
must hasten to explain that confusion over concepts,
functions, and the relationships among them, can
render efforts at strategic education more harmful
than beneficial. The medical rule, “first, do no harm,”
applies amply to well-intentioned efforts at education in
strategy. The guiding light for this analysis is provided,
as so often is the case, by Clausewitz. The Prussian
wrote that “[t]he primary purpose of any theory is to
clarify concepts and ideas that have become, as it were,
confused and entangled.”7
The words that we employ matter profoundly
because they shape the way that we are able to think
about phenomena. As we shall strive to explain, because
there are more than enough causes of poor strategic
performance over which the strategist has only limited
control, if that, there should be no excuse for selfinflicted, hence gratuitous, conceptual wounds. For the
scholar, definitions are arbitrary, discretionary, ever
arguable, and are judged more or less useful, which
is to say fit for their purpose. Warriors, of course, do
not enjoy the luxury of scholarly discretion over the
common meaning of words and phrases. Manuals of
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doctrine have to define terms to ensure that all users
employ the same words with the same meanings.
Since this monograph is not a venture in doctrine
creation, it limits its ambition to the attempt at clarity
in explanation, with precise choice of words accorded
only a secondary significance, always provided the
language does not impede the explanation.
It has long been commonplace to claim that while
one has a strategy, one does tactics. This is useful, and in
an important sense true, but, alas, it is also misleading.
Why is that so? The truth that strategy is done by tactics
is overshadowed by the yet greater truth that strategy
is done as tactics.
Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., advises wisely that:
At the most fundamental level, it is accepted that the
strategist directs the tactician. The mission of every
battle plan is passed from the higher commander to the
lower. There is no more basic precept than that, and no
principle of war is given greater status than the primacy
of the objective.
This is not the same as saying that strategy determines
tactics and the course of battle. Strategy and tactics are
best thought of as handmaidens, but if one must choose,
it is probably more correct to say that tactics come first
because they dictate the limits of strategy. Strategy must
be conceived with battle in mind. . . .8

There is a crucial sense in which tactical behavior
cannot help to be other than strategic behavior. It
may be paradoxical, but it is really inescapable, that
theory (strategy as a plan) and practice (tactical action)
are one, they comprise a gestalt. The paradox arises
in the inalienable and simultaneous essential unity
of strategy and tactics, and their no less essential and
inalienable difference. The difference is that between
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purpose and instrument. In principle, tactical behavior
should not be strictly self-referential, as it were autistic,
because then it must lack the very political meaning
that defines it as warfare in war. In these pages, I shall
advance the thesis that both the theory and the practice
of strategy need to be taught, insofar as they can be,
because an education in strategy must encompass
ideas and the application of those ideas as plans that
have to be implemented by command performance.
All of the “dots” need to be connected, from strategy’s
general theory to the tactical doing of a strategy at any
and every level of warfare, in any and every kind of
war.9
Unarguably, the meaning of the word strategy has
altered, by and large it has become ever more inclusive
up the logical and command hierarchy, since the late
18th century. Scholars can argue and have argued about
the linguistic provenance of our contemporary usage of
the word.10 What matters is that we should not confuse
ourselves, and that we should be inoculated by sound
strategic education against false doctrines, faddish
concepts, ephemerally fashionable buzzwords, and
the chaotic and inconsistent (mis)use of language. Any
definition of strategy unambiguously must convey the
idea that it is about directing and using something to
achieve a selected purpose. Extant definitions abound,
and many of them have a distinctive merit. For the
purpose of this discussion for the intended audience for
this monograph, I choose to define (military) strategy
as the direction and use that is made of force and the threat of
force for the ends of policy. Deliberately following, but not
slavishly repeating, Clausewitz, I distinguish as clearly
as I am able between (military) assets and the use that is
made of them. On War provides the verbal formula: “[s]
trategy is the use of the engagement for the purpose of
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the war.”11 It proceeds immediately to explain that “[t]
he strategist must therefore define an aim for the entire
operational side of the war that will be in accordance
with its purpose. In other words, he will draft the plan
of the war.” Emphatically, Clausewitz does not say, or
mean, that tactics is what happens in the battlespace,
be the geography extensive or confined, while strategy
is what is done away from that battlespace. He does
not confuse strategy with logistics.
Instrumentality is the most core of the ideas that
express the nature of strategy. It is the purposeful use
of some instrument or instruments. That purpose,
whatever it may be—political in the case in point
here—can be achieved in whole or in part only by the
securing of some control over the rival/enemy.12 And
the pursuit of such control is performed with a plan, a
strategy. The plan can be formal or informal, rigid or
flexible, well conceived or otherwise, developed by an
elaborate process of staffwork and consultation among
stakeholders, or by a lonely individual, but plan there
should be. Ironically, strategic effect is generated
whether or not there is anything that resembles a
strategy in a plan. All military (tactical) behavior has
strategic weight, be it ever so small or even of net
negative value.13 To explain: The course of events in a
conflict is shaped in good part by competing military
performances. Those interlocking and somewhat
interdependent military performances will happen,
and will have consequences, military and political,
whether or not the belligerents did strategy explicitly.
In practice, all belligerents cannot help but do strategy
by default, even should the strategic function be
seriously undergoverned or even absent altogether as
a cohesive and purposeful whole endeavor.
Some experienced intending reformers of the
American Professional Military Education (PME) have
8

noted plausibly that strategy is neither arcane and
mysterious, nor is it confined to a particular level of
war, that is, above operations and below policy. Instead,
they claim credibly enough that the strategic function
is authoritative at every level, and that strategy can and
should be taught with this in mind.14 What they mean,
correctly in this educator’s opinion, is that all players in
the national security hierarchy must do, or contribute
somehow to the doing, of strategy, for their particular
purposes. Clarified, this translates as the thesis that the
trinity of ends, ways, and means, or should it be ends,
means, and ways for interesting variation, explain
what is attempted in tactics, operations, military
strategy, and grand strategy. Every soldier with some
command responsibility, great or small, has to manage
this inescapable trinity of factors as best he can.
Unfortunately for the would-be strategic educator,
the elegant simplicity of the concept of a triadically
structured strategic function working at every level
is entirely too simple, notwithstanding its essential
truth. The challenge is two-fold and complex. First, is
it necessary but not sufficient for the tactical soldier
to understand how his available means can best be
employed to achieve the objectives he is given. That
alone is no easy matter. In addition, the tactical and
operational (level) soldier requires some grasp of at
least the realities at the next level above his
responsibilities. The tactician needs to know the
operational purpose of his tactical behavior, lest the
latter harm the former. Similarly, the operational
level soldier, the general, has to comprehend why his
selected behavior should advance the prospects for
success overall in the course of the war. As Robert
Lyman claims convincingly, the operational level of
warfare needs to be conducted by generals who have a
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“strategic sense.”15 But there is a long tradition of belief
that the operational level of warfare is one wherein
classic generalship can be exercised in a military context
that is blessedly politics-free, or at least politics-lite.
This is a perilously erroneous belief.
The second major problem with the neatly
functional-at-every-level view of strategy, is the
challenge of currency conversion in the absence of a
stable exchange rate. This challenge grows mightily in
difficulty as one ascends the pertinent hierarchy from
tactics through operations, to military strategy, grand
strategy, and policy, all the way to the inspiring vision
which launched and then fuelled it all with probably
vague higher purpose (a single communized world
community, a very much greater Germany, a wholly
democratized, “free,” and free-standing, community
of states, and the like).16 With respect to relative quality
of trouble, the most difficult challenge is that posed
to the military strategist who must, with military
effects and their consequences, change currency
from net military achievement to net political result.
It is one thing to estimate the character and weight
of aerial bombardment necessary to secure some
specific level of damage. It is quite another to seek to
identify metrically a cause and effect nexus between
damage imposed and enemy political compliance.17
I must rush to add that even the relatively easy task,
that of prediction of damage, let alone the military
and economic harm that that should impose, is a far
from elementary task. The point of emphasis here is
that although the strategic function must apply to all
levels of warfare and war, the heart of the matter, and
necessarily the focus of this monograph, has to be the
mission of education on strategic effect where military
achievement has to count in the foreign currency of
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political will. Clausewitz was in no doubt as to the
scale of the challenge. The generically strategic (endsways-means) problem may seem to be wholly military
for the tactician and the operational level soldier, but
this is not so. On War enlightens as follows:
If you want to overcome your enemy, you must match
your effort against his power of resistance, which can be
expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz.
the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will. The
extent of the means at his disposal is a matter—though
not exclusively—of figures, and should be measurable.
But the strength of his will is much less easy to determine
and can only be gauged approximately by the strength
of the motive animating it.18

In seeking to understand strategy, it is necessary
to recognize that it is locatable diagrammatically on a
horizontal as well as a vertical axis of implied relative
authority. This claim means that although strategy is
logically and even officially typically placed between
policy and tactics (to simplify), there is a vital sense
in which the interdependence among the three—yet
another crucial threesome—is perilously underrated
by the hierarchical model.19 The flow chart showing
ideal connections, with descending authority and
domain, yet with helpful feedback(up) loops, quite
often bears no relationship to actual historical practice.
To illustrate, if for now your army cannot win decisive
success by fighting (tactically), you are obliged to adopt
a long-haul strategy guided by a concept of victory
by attrition. Tactics can dictate strategy, at least they
can if policy dictates to the army that it must achieve
a complete military victory. This illustrative logic
was the actual condition of the land warfare in World
War I from 1915 until the late Summer of 1918. The
true villains of the piece were the politicians on both
11

sides who demanded more of their armies than those
armies could deliver. Tactical feasibility drove strategic
choice. This is an enduring fact about warfare. Strategic
success has to be forged from tactical advantage. If the
latter is unattainable, for whatever blend of reasons,
then strategy is mere vain ambition.
Why do we want to teach strategy for 21st century
conflict? Obviously, the answer has to be because we
need strategists to do strategy for us. But, who are
they? What are their roles? And what, exactly, do we
mean by “doing strategy”? For easily understandable
reasons, academics are prone to a preference for
teaching strategy on a curriculum that privileges ideas.
The widespread recognition of the fortunate existence
of one or two handfuls—recently I have specified 10—
of authors of classic works of strategy theory, has the
somewhat unfortunate consequence of encouraging
overemphasis upon intellectual potency at the cost
of character and personality.20 Modern works on
strategy, especially those written by a civilian (such as
this author), readily can mislead an unduly credulous
readership into believing that the key to strategic
competence is conceptual grasp. Such grasp is indeed
essential. It is necessary that would-be strategists
be assisted in their, in fact, our, effort to know how
to think about strategy. But mastery of the theory of
strategy, even when the theory is appreciated courtesy
of the finest thoughts by the sharpest minds in strategic
intellectual history, is not synonymous with mastery
of strategy. Michael Clarke explained in a pithy maxim
that “[i]t is easy to think strategically, it is hard to act
strategically.”21 The first half of the dictum is eminently
challengeable, but the second, in juxtaposition with the
first, offers close to brilliant insight, notwithstanding its
apparent banality. I am concerned that this monograph
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of teaching strategy should corral properly its true
components. If we can assume, as we should, that
strategy, even strategic theory or thinking—following
Bernard Brodie—is a pragmatic subject, we can
contextualize suitably the intellectual dimension to
strategic education.22 Rephrased, we need to answer
the elementary, nay elemental, question, “What are we
educating aspiring strategists for?” In order to answer
that question, we have to answer the prior one, “What
might strategists need to be able to do?” What does
it mean to be a “strategist”? I suggest that a strategist
could be required, within the meaning of “strategist,”
to:
1. Theorize abstractly and contribute to the
development, or more accurately the interpretation, of
strategy’s eternal and universal general theory.
2. Conceive, invent, or discover, the master idea(s)
that provide the basic guidance for planners in
particular historical contexts.
3. Shape and draft the actual historical operational
plans, also known as strategies, for the use of the
armed forces; this requires command and control of
the process of strategic planning, including adaptive
planning once the enemy begins to cast his vote.
4. Command and control of the attempted
implementation of plans by troops “in the field,”
a broad duty that entails choice of subordinate
commanders, overwatch of their performance, and,
to repeat, readiness to adjust plans as events unfold.
Classic generalship is necessary at several levels of
responsibility, involving command and leadership.
This typology is only a rather foreshortened
shortlist. It would be plausible to claim some need for
the “strategist” to be able to function at one end of the
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spectrum as a politician; while at the other end, we may
have some requirement for the aura of heroic warrior.
The important point is that the teaching of strategy
cannot be divorced from an intelligent understanding
of the full range of the strategist’s possible roles.
The central truth here is that strategy is an applied
scientific art, with emphasis mainly on the noun and
not the adjective. Strategy cannot sensibly be regarded
and treated pedagogically as if it were a free-floating
body of mighty truths. It is not a cluster of brilliant
insights mined from the depths of Thucydides, Suntzu, and Clausewitz, although the products of such
mining, properly contextualized, indeed is essential
for an education in strategy pedagogically worthy of
the name. Strategic theory is only entertainment, even
a source of ironic amusement, save with reference to
its value for strategic practice. And, to reemphasize,
strategic practice cannot strictly be defined as the
cogitations, or even the activities of planning and
commanding performed by people designated officially as strategists. The reason, to repeat, is because
all military activity has some net strategic weight that
scores for the home team on the course of events. Every
corporal is a strategic corporal. Also, recall the claim
advanced earlier that the strategic function of mutually
adjusting for coherence the eternal elements of ends,
ways, and means, is a feature of all levels of military
behavior in warfare.23
To ensure that this discussion does not lose focus
because of the desire of the author-theorist to be
comprehensive and logically rigorous, as well as faithful to historical reality, it is time for me to narrow the
aim of the analysis. For the purposes of this monograph,
a strategist is understood to be a professional military
person charged either, or both, with: (1) guiding and

14

shaping subordinate military operations by major
units in campaigns for the purpose of securing military
advantage (success or victory); and (2) guiding and
shaping the course of military events for the purpose
of achieving the polity’s political goals. In short,
the subject of primary interest here is education for
generals coping down the chain of command with
the use of major military formations, and for generals
striving to deliver upwards for the satisfaction of policy
the military advantage achieved by the operational
level of warfare. I am aware of the historical fact
that in different times, places, and circumstances,
the relations among politics, strategy, and tactics
can assume widely different forms. Nonetheless, the
two core behaviors just identified as our prime foci,
truly are ubiquitous in kind. All belligerents have to
strive for purposeful coherence in the activities by the
elements that contribute to their military instrument;
and all belligerents, similarly, must seek to employ that
instrument in such ways that their political ambitions
are advanced. The strategic function is eternal, looking
both up and down the vertical hierarchy. It may be
anachronistic to employ such words as strategy and
grand strategy when we seek to recover the motives
of, say, Roman and Byzantine politicians and military
commanders. But, some historians’ views in opposition
notwithstanding, the Romans “did” strategy and
grand strategy.24 This is not to dismiss the charge of
anachronism quite out of hand too peremptorily. The
accusation of inappropriate backward projection of our
contemporary concepts upon Romans, inter alia, who
were innocent of our words, does have some small
merit. Anachronism can have value.
It is useful to return to the important subject of
what it is that we require of our strategists, grand and,
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especially significant for this monograph, military. For
what and in what do we need to educate strategists?
Norman F. Dixon’s seriously flawed classic On the
Psychology of Military Incompetence made at least
one highly significant, verifiably accurate, broad
judgment that is helpful for our enquiry.25 Specifically,
he insisted plausibly that the principal cause of
military incompetence was not stupidity. Dixon was
impressed by the rigidity, the stubbornness, of some
commanders. In trying to bring psychology to the task
of understanding why some commanders succeed
and then fail, the professional psychologist tends to
bring too much potential help to the job to be useful.
For a leading example, the concept of the authoritarian
personality has a way of overdetermining what in
truth is a challenge to comprehension that should be
met neither by one or two imperial hypotheses, nor
by a dominant approach, in this case psychology.
Psychohistory offers only one window into a person,
and a noticeably unreliable one at that.
Psychologists are right to insist upon the significance of personality for behavior, but in common
with most professions, they tend to provide only a
single tool for a problem-set with features that defy
investigation along only one track. The endeavor
to educate strategists has to be shaped with a cleareyed view of what makes for competence or better,
or the opposite, in a person whose job description
fits the rather exclusive definition offered here.
Education in strategy is seeking to influence a person
whose performance must be the dynamic product
of the mixture of biology, psychology/personality,
experience, and opportunity. Intellect alone is not the
key to high strategic performance. It may suffice if the
strategist must perform strictly as a planner, though

16

even then an individual will need to be effective in
communicating the fruits of his brilliance to others
for the common good of the excellent plan. Character
cannot substitute for intelligence, but neither can a
high IQ stand duty for personality features necessary
for leadership, if not always for command.
The brightest students at service academies do not
always make superior strategists. The most effective
tactical leaders may not shine at higher levels of
command. Recall the infamous “Peter Principle,” that
people rise to their level of incompetence. Sometimes,
excellent colonels are promoted to be adequate brigadier generals, and then to be dangerously incompetent
major and lieutenant generals. No less interesting,
lackluster junior officers, if they can survive through
the promotion process, have been known to deliver
ever improving performance with each step up in rank.
There is no reliable correlation, let alone certain cause
and effect, between effectiveness in doing strategy
tactically (if I may be excused the apparent oxymoron),
and thinking, planning, and commanding tactical
success for more inclusive gains. Bluntly stated, good
tacticians do not always prove to be good strategists;
while good strategists need not have recorded a truly
glittering career at the tactical level of warfare. But
it is a general rule of no little authority that a person
who might become a famously first-class strategist
will never be granted the opportunity to shine at that
higher level unless first he can perform well enough
at those lower ranks wherein the duties did not fit his
capabilities so closely. There is irony in the probable
fact that some of the qualities that contribute usefully
to career success, and which seem plainly to point the
way eventually (accidents and enemies permitting) to
many “stars,” are probably features either irrelevant,
or even harmful, to genuinely strategic performance.
17

The relevance of these paragraphs to this narrative
lies in their contribution to an understanding of the
human dimension to the challenge of teaching strategy.
Also, scarcely less important, they help maintain focus
upon “the plot,” which should be an inclusive approach
to performance of the strategic function. Armed forces
have no interest in strategic concepts per se. They need
mastery of strategic concepts tied together as coherent
theory, because strategy has to be done by strategists
on top of their subject. And, it should be needless to
repeat for a military readership, the strategic ideas
that are adapted for particular needs in plans then
have to be translated into action “in the battlespace,”
guided adaptively by military command and sufficient
control. A civilian university can attempt erroneously
to teach strategic theory solely with reference to
intellectual history. But soldiers must use theory for
their practice. And the practice of strategy calls for
qualities of character that extend beyond, though
assuredly include, the intellect. If moral courage of a
high order and at least a good intellect are not both
present, the outcome is apt to be the courageously
determined, stubborn pursuit of a foolish plan, or—for
a variant—the inability to decide which among several
exciting and creative options to pursue, or perhaps a
lack of courage to match the brilliance of a strategic
operational conception.
Civilian scholars have been known to have trouble
really understanding the second half of the quotation
offered from Michael Clarke (page 12). For the soldier,
and by extension for the policymaker who has to
depend upon the soldier, theory and practice must be
approached holistically. The United States requires not
only colonels and generals to understand strategy, vital
though that is, no less it needs generals who can get the
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core job of successful combat done in the field. This is
strategy in action. Napoleon did not enjoy a significantly
unique insight into the character of contemporary
warfare, let alone the eternal nature of war. Rather
was his typical trademark an extraordinary practical
ability to realize his intention and plans “in the field,”
adequately, in the face of enemies with independent
wills and friction in all its many forms, predictable and
other, the known as well as the “unknown unknowns.”26
Robert E. Lee needed corps and division commanders
who both enjoyed some “strategic sense,” but also
who could fight their commands successfully in battle
through the competent exercise of real- and near-realtime leadership.27
In the modern world, while it remains vital that
strategy should be taught with close regard for its
intellectual content, also, as just noted, there should
always be recognition that ultimately it must be a
practical, not a scholarly, pursuit. Education in strategy
for potentially designated strategists is education with
attitude. When strategic ideas are debated in a university seminar room to civilians, the students’ strengths
and weaknesses of character are not likely to have
much bearing upon their subject. After all, they will
not be required to turn in a strategic performance in a
live military or political-military context. Philosophers,
even superb ones, are encouraged to harbor doubt.
They may weave an unsteady path in brilliant opinions
from erudite book to erudite book. One can be something of a military philosopher and conduct oneself
likewise, possibly as a slave to the latest popular
epiphany. But a general as practicing strategist does
not seek truth unadorned, rather he requires a
contextually good enough truth for him to perform
successfully the task at hand. In professional military
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strategic education, the quality of both strategy and
strategist are vital. The former is irrelevant if the latter
is unable to get it done, almost no matter how well he
understands the structure of the challenge.
At this juncture we will both step back from
consideration of the fundamentals of strategy and its
performance by people who we can call strategists,
and look forward to the strategic and other contexts
of 21st century conflicts for which their skills will be
needed.
21st Century Conflict.
If a person can think strategically, no matter
whether this facility is acquired largely from nature or
from nurture, he can do so about anything. The skill
is indifferent to subject. That said, the strategist with
talent, if not genius, needs the contextual specifics
for flexibly adaptive application of strategy’s general
theory. To explain, the general theory of strategy was as
relevant to the behavior of the American Expeditionary
Force (AEF) of 1917-18, as it is to the American forces
fighting in Afghanistan today. But the contextual
differences between the two cases are so enormous
that it is easy to see why Clausewitz insisted upon only
an educational role for theory, and not an historically
prescriptive one.28 A benign synergism from the effects
of native wit and life experience may suffice to yield
strategic competence, but we, and every other defense
community, major and minor, are prudent in assuming
that natural talent, though possibly not genius, is
likely to be augmented by some formal education in
the essentials of strategy. These basics can be accessed
and possibly comprehended from the written texts
that by wide agreement comprise the classical canon
of (general) strategic theory. One can argue over the
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marginal entries to the canonical literature, but by
and large there is all but universal, nonculturally
specific, consensus on the most authoritative works.29
Obviously, this is good news for the educator. Rather
less good news is the challenge to know what to teach
aspiring strategists about their particular temporal
domain of strategic history and its relevant contexts.
We may nearly all agree on most of the elements that
constitute strategy’s general theory, and we can agree
also broadly on how those elements function, or should
function, interdependently. But, agreement diminishes
rapidly once we can leave the relatively settled and
secure zone of eternal and universal theory and venture
upon the perilous terrain of actual strategies for today
and tomorrow. It is necessary never to forget that no
matter how robust and historically bullet-proof is our
general theory, such wisdom can only be useful if it is
adopted and adapted for all too particular historical
needs in operational strategies-as-plans. For a vitally
associated point, just as the elegant and dazzling
insights of general theory do not themselves, and
should not be expected to, deliver practical strategic
value, for that one needs translation into specific
strategies, so the strategist educated in theory has to
perform strategically in practice.30 But what kind of
strategic practice can be anticipated today?
Although it is commonplace to postulate a
spectrum of conflict, there is probably more value in
conceiving of future conflict by means of a (or several)
Venn diagram(s). Rather than approaching warfare
conceptually along a spectrum ranging from most
irregular to most regular, one should favor a model
that is nonlinear and which does not even imply
a prospective reality to option purity. Overlap is a
quality that requires respect. This argument reads like
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an endorsement for the concept of “hybrid” wars.31 In
a sense that is so, but this theorist is not enthusiastic
about adjectival qualifiers to the terms war, warfare,
and strategy. The historical record shows incontestably
that nearly all wars have been more or less “hybrid.” It
is neither historically accurate, nor especially useful, to
suggest to the unwary that there is a distinctive species
of conflict now known as “hybrid.” Nonetheless, the
adjective has some existential merit in that it points to
such an important characteristic of wars and warfare
that one might choose to regard hybridity as being
in the very nature of war. Strategists today have to
grasp the holism of their subject, and that subject must
accommodate conflict, competition, rivalry, dueling,
war, warfare, and strategy itself. The character of every
conflict is to a degree distinctive. Moreover, nearly all
conflicts have so-called regular and irregular features.
And those features were present at one and the same
time, often in the same conflict spaces. Conflict in
the 21st century primarily most likely will be neither
regular nor irregular, but in some measure nearly
always significantly mixed or “hybrid” in character.
Similarly, to cite another large but somewhat opaque
descriptor, conflict will be asymmetrical. Only rarely
are belligerents and their preferred styles in warfare
very closely matched.
Given that there is no way of predicting exactly
which conflicts will engage the professional skills of
America’s strategists in the future, there is no prudent
alternative other than to prepare them for the full range
of competitive possibilities in peace and especially in
war. It is an elementary challenge to claim persuasively
that future conflicts will be largely irregular in
character. Ergo, American strategic education needs
to privilege the skill set most suitable for effectiveness
in irregular warfare. For some good reasons, the
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distinctive competencies for counterinsurgency
(COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) are fashionable. But
the story of today ought to be seen not as a shift away
from focus on a regular style of warfare. Instead, the
narrative ought to be one of a belated recovery of lost
skills, in the context of ever necessary other military
capabilities. Because we believe that we understand
the conflicts of the 2000s, with their highlighting of the
phenomenon of the “accidental guerrilla,” we need to
be alert to the danger that our new found confidence
will prove largely misplaced should we assume it to
be authoritative for the conflicts of the years to come.32
The no-name post-Cold War era endured barely for
a decade, from December 1991 until September 2001.
The first decade of the 21st century may both merit
the label the (or an) Age of Terror, but historical
perspective and moderate prudence suggest that this
era also is likely to be brief. Terrorism will always be
with us, but it always has been, more or less. It is not at
all anachronistic to claim that interstate, indeed greater
and great, power rivalries are distinctly alive and
well today. The currencies of power in world politics
continue to include the military instrument.
Although economic globalization is a significant
reality, it is thoroughly unmatched by political, culturalmoral, and truly authoritative legal globalization. The
latter domains continue to be critically state-, certainly
nation-, dominated. For illustration, Russia’s Gazprom
has indeed gone global, but it has done so in ways, and
for reasons, that have everything to do with Russian
geopolitical interests.33 Similarly, although the Chinese
economy does globalization by most definitions, the
process has been guided by an official determination
that the country must be more powerful as well as
more wealthy. The two do not march inalienably in
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lock-step. For example, although the European Union
(EU) is wealthy by any standard, if unevenly so, its
footprint as a player in the enduring game of power
politics is quite disproportionately light.
The spectrum (or, alternatively, the Venn diagram)
of 21st century conflict embraces the complete range
of possibilities. Interstate conflict is a reality today,
though a reality currently in the backseat of history
to a prevalence of intrastate and transstate conflict.
Contemporary strategic education cannot afford to
neglect any character of conflict, no matter what current
fashion predicts and anticipates.
Those who strive to educate in grand and military
strategy can be confident that their mission will always
be necessary. This is sad, but, again unarguably, true.
Louis J. Halle explained why when he advised that
“Thucydides, as he himself anticipated, wrote the
history of the Napoleonic wars, World War I, World
War II, and the Cold War.”34 The Greek historian’s
tersely compounded explanation of the primary
motives in statecraft—“fear, honor, and interest”—are
as valid for the 21st century as they were for the 5th
century BCE (Before the Common Era, formerly known
as BC or Before Christ). To amplify the point, other
leading trinitarian explanations have a like enduring
authority. There is Clausewitz’s trinity of passion,
chance, and reason, to which one could add Kautilya’s
specification of the sources of power: intellect, wealth
and military strength, and psychology.35 For the basic
structure of a human history that has always been
strategic, we have the familiar triadic formula of ends,
ways, and means. Thucydides donates the necessary
conceptual tools, which we have to augment with
sufficient specific details to render them operational. He
explains why there will continue to be conflict and war
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in this century, as in all previous ones, but his brilliant
triptych cannot be employed to predict individual
wars. Nonetheless, for the educator it is more than
merely helpful to be able to explain so elegantly and
persuasively the fundamental motives that will shape
policy and strategy in the future.
To teach about 21st century conflict is a challenge
greatly eased by the elemental distinction between
continuity and discontinuity. We know for certain
that in the future there will be conflicts, including
wars, and again for certain, in general terms, we know
why there will be conflicts and wars. But what we do
not and cannot know is exactly which rivalries will
become conflicts which will erupt into wars. There is
both good and bad news in this story. The bad news
is that rivalry, conflict, and war are assured future
realities. The better news is that no particular political
rivalry inexorably and unavoidably must transition
into conflict and war.
Poverty in political and strategic education
has been responsible for a great deal of naïve, and
therefore necessarily incompetent, policymaking since
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) filed
definitively for reorganization in December 1991.
Neither the appearance of geopolitical discontinuity
in world history effected by the end of the Cold War,
nor the acceleration of an economic and information
technology (IT)-led process of globalization, has
imposed any significant change upon the fundamental
working of intercommunity relations (interstate and
intrastate). But so much of the detail has altered that
scholars, politicians, and other commentators who
should know better, have spoken, and even behaved,
as if the apparent geopolitical revolution of 1991 had
altered the nature of competitive political life. Politics
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is about power; it always has been and always will
be. And when power, which is a dynamic relative
quantity, as well as a value, is contested among security
communities, the possibility of organized violence,
military force, is imprinted in the DNA of the context.
It is easy to overprivilege the sad continuity
in human political conflict, with its often present
possibility of violence, and as a consequence adopt
unwisely a fatalistic attitude. That said, it is well to
remember that just as the first charge on an army is that
to be effective at its most distinctive core competency,
which is combat, so strategists should not shrink
from their professional duty to study the politically
purposeful use of force. Because many lands, most of
the time, do not suffer from the curse of Mars, it does
not follow that it is cynical, anachronistic, or in any
way inappropriate for students of strategy to worry
constructively about possible, if not necessarily actual,
challenges to national and international security. And
we know that those challenges in the 21st century must
embrace rather more variants of conflict and warfare,
probably all of them somewhat “hybrid,” than the first
decade of the century has revealed.
History (which is to say, historians) does not tell
us what to expect, but it does provide warnings that
should be unmistakeable and which we ignore at our
most acute peril. It is not only useful, it is literally
vital, that we acknowledge the certainty of historical
discontinuities, at least the appearance of such, in the
future. The reason that this matters so vitally is because
unless we register as facts the coming of some known,
suspected, and genuinely unknown unknowns, it is not
possible for us to conduct prudent defense planning.
The (military) strategist in time of peace, at least in a
time mercifully innocent of the conduct of warfare on
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a massive scale, will lack reliable feedback on his/her
competitive performance. How good is the general
who has yet to command in warfare? How fit for its
purpose will be the U.S. military posture of, say, 2019
or 2029, given that much, perhaps most, of that political
purpose may not be extant in detail more than a year
or a month ahead of the time that calls for action? It
is obvious wisdom, and has to be sound advice, to
recommend safely that our strategists should conduct
U.S. defense planning obedient to a rule of minimum
regrets. The test for adequate strategic performance
in peacetime must be adaptability and flexibility, not
excluding suitability for unfashionable categories of
future conflict and warfare.36 Looking in our historical
rear-view mirror, we can see that the United States
was appallingly unprepared militarily for the opening
phase of the three great wars of the 20th century.37
Future political shock is guaranteed by the nature of
human history, just as is a military strategic dimension
to that history. There is no discretion in the matter.
We will be hugely surprised, and we will have need
of a military instrument fit enough for the political
character of the conflictual context at issue.
No matter how hard one tries, there is no escaping
the perspective of today when we strive to educate for
tomorrow. What I have claimed, not merely suggested,
is that although we cannot possibly teach the history
of a 21st century that still has 90 years to run, in fact,
we know a great deal about those years, both near and
distant. Our general theory of statecraft and strategy
yields more than just adequate assistance in the crucial
task of knowing how to think about the future. The
major problem is how to cope well enough with the
certain and identified challenges of today and the
immediate future, without allowing ourselves to be
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captured by the “presentist” fallacy of believing that
tomorrow is visible in the events and apparent trends
of 2009. Strategic education must in part be fueled
by appreciation of the ever shifting detail of history,
but it should never be led by, and certainly it ought
not to be confined to, the study of current events or
contemporary history, for a slightly more elevated
term. Strategists “educated” almost entirely by today
would be uneducated for tomorrow’s “today.” Indeed,
such erroneous education would not be education at
all.
How to Teach Strategy.
In his recent study of Anglo-American grand
strategy and strategists in World War II, historian
Andrew Roberts claims credibly that “[m]ore often
the Britons and Americans would take up positions
according to nationality, but sometimes alliances were
formed across both professional and national lines; just
as politicians had to master strategy, so the soldiers
were forced to become political.”38 Each profession
was obliged by the bridging nature of strategy to
operate outside its high comfort zone. Politicians are
typically on thin ice when they contribute to military
strategy, while soldiers must overcome skill, ethical,
and sometimes even legal, challenges, when they are
required to offer advice, and more, on subjects that
transcend the narrowly military. It is possible, and I
believe it is necessary and beneficial, to distinguish
in theory among politics, policy, and grand strategy/
national security strategy. But there is no doubt that in
practice, quite frequently in history, the three concepts
essentially are fused or collapsed each into the others
inextricably. It should be needless to add that this
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reality can be a source of deep discomfort to some
professional soldiers. One has to qualify the argument
by referring only to “some” soldiers, because every
generation of military professionals, everywhere,
contains at least a few generals who have the talent
and personality for politics. They just happen to have
taken the military road relatively early in life. For
reasons that do not need rehearsing here, in democratic
polities of most varieties, as well as in democracies of
a more “guided” and “administered” kind (Vladimir
Putin’s Russia describes itself as an “administered
democracy”), soldiers are either required or are strongly recommended to abstain from political activity. This
is not to deny that the concept of the political is fit for
inconclusive disputation.
The relevance of these remarks pertains, with some
discomfort, to the realities of the practice of strategy
in the zone where politics and the military instrument
meet, which is to say on or very close to the metaphorical
“strategy bridge.” In an idealized world, for good or
ill, and probably mainly for the latter, the (typically)
civilian policymaker says “go get them”—this clearly
is a lawful command from the distinctive world of
policy—and the top soldier of the polity salutes, says
“yes, sir!” and proceeds, unimpeded subsequently by
political harassment, to exercise his professional skill as
a soldier. The army is mobilized, and military strategy
is determined according to the ways best suited to
achieve the military goals that would translate as the
military victory that policy demands. Of course, this
simple narrative is a nonsense, and it always has
been. In practice, policy is produced by politics, and
because politics is a continuous process, so policy will
shift. Moreover, all military strategy is grand strategy,
though the latter is greater than the former, and the
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military professionals cannot responsibly simply take
orders to fight from the realm of policy. The policy
choices that they need to translate into military goals
need to be calibrated with consideration of military
ways and means. This is but the tip of the iceberg of the
contextual interdependencies that staple the military
professional as strategist to distinctly nonmilitary
factors for consideration. How can strategy be taught,
given its complexities and the real-world domination
of contingency? Strategic surprise is a subject that this
theorist addressed some years ago in a monograph for
the Strategic Studies Institute.39
Paradoxically, and even ironically, the principal
challenge to the would-be strategic educator is far
easier than it appears. With Clausewitz as our leading
mentor, we have to recognize that although it is
necessary for senior generals to have a good base of
knowledge on many subjects, there is no requirement
for them to be a walking, or helicoptered, encyclopedia,
a true polymath. The United States does not need its
generals to know everything; rather does it need them
to know what they have to know and, more important
still, it needs them to know how to find out what they
should know. Since the 1800s, the military profession
in most countries has invented and developed modern
staff systems so that the commanding general, even
if he happens to be a genius, does not need to know
everything himself. Also, given the size and complex
articulation of armies, it has long been impossible
even for genius to do almost everything himself.40 But,
beyond the acquisition of information it is necessary
that the general, and general-to-be, should gain
knowledge. However, knowledge itself, let alone
information, is of no value to command performance
in pursuit of the strategic effect that is the purpose of
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strategy. The human being in the uniform has to be
able to extract understanding from his knowledge, and
he needs the ability to use that understanding for the
effective exercise of goal-focused command.
To answer the question “How should strategy
be taught?” it is necessary first to be both clear and
realistic about the exercise of the strategic function.
Too often, institutions of higher military education do
not ask themselves just what, or who, it is that they
are attempting to teach. Should such a college seek to
teach the body of professional lore that passes muster
as “strategy,” meaning the classics and near classics
of strategic theory? Or do they really have in mind
the education of people who might be promotable
to be designated, formally or less so, as “strategists.”
As much to the point and to be blunt, should one
concentrate on teaching the subject of strategy, or the
whole person of the strategist? All of strategic history,
not least as it is interpreted in the pages of On War,
tries to tell us that we should teach the people who are
educable those things in which they can be instructed,
while recognizing and to a degree encouraging the
creativity that an insightful intelligence will allow and
generate. Creative genius, alas, is not the only kind of
genius of which a country stands in need. In addition,
it requires of its creative strategist(s) the ability to turn
brilliant insights into effective command performance.
In other words, it is not sufficient to educate strategists
who know what should be done, or at least what might
with great boldness be attempted. Also, there is an
absolute requirement for a few, fortunately probably
only a very few, strategists who are people of action as
well as creative thought. Such persons have to be good
enough, though not distinguished, strategic thinkers,
strategically minded planners, commanders, and
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leaders. Mastery of the strategic classics is necessary,
but can never be enough. There is always need for the
person who not only understands the vital concept
of the “culminating point of victory,” but also who is
likely to be able to identify it in real-time and not when
it is much too late (e.g., not when one’s troops reach
the Volga or approach the Yalu).41
Without wishing to understate the awesome
challenges of the strategist’s role in the no man’s land
where politics/policy and military power meet—on
that strategy bridge, yet again—neither should we
fail to recognize the functional strategic education
by everyday experience at lower levels of behavior.
Regarded as it should be, as a function, intimately
interconnecting the trinity of ends, ways, and means, it
is indisputable that planning and command execution
at every level of military life, and most civilian ones
also, is in a basic functional sense “strategic.” Platoon
and company leaders in combat trouble have to
resolve life and death conundrums that are composed
structurally of ends, ways, and means. It ought to
follow from this almost banal empirically universal
fact, that education by practice in strategy is rather
more extensive than commonly is appreciated. But for
the killer challenge to what might be thought to be a
very widespread functional strategic competence, the
major difficulty for the strategist is currency conversion
across categories of behavior. Yes, the tactician has to
manage coherently his tactical ends, ways, and means,
but there can be great difficulty converting the tactical
advantage of a multitude of military engagements
into a significant operational level gain. While the
challenge to the overall military strategist, of course,
has to be the necessity to employ operational success
for advantage in the course of the war as a whole. As
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if that were not trouble enough, the superior military
strategist is charged with so conducting his military
orchestra of operational successes and failures, that
his polity’s political ambitions are advanced, if not
necessarily secured. A point is reached beyond which
the battlefield will have contributed all that it is able,
and the game of politics is played wholly by politicians,
albeit by politicians who are likely to need the coercive
value of some military menace slightly off-stage.
It is necessary to admit that although much of high
importance about strategy can and should be taught,
as we develop in the next section, also there is much
that cannot be learnt by anything other than firsthand
experience. Although there is a great deal to be said in
favor of learning about strategy from the mistakes of
others, it has to be admitted that nothing can compete in
effectiveness with a truly personal impact. Dr. Samuel
Johnson (especially as rephrased felicitously by John
Gaddis, as quoted here) offered this relevant thought:
“danger is a school for strategy.”42 The doctor’s wise
words, modernized by Gaddis, present a significant
thought that has much merit. But it must be noted as
a potent caveat that challenge need not stimulate an
effective response, intellectual, moral, or physical.
Learning by doing is more likely to educate the educable strategist better than is education by observation.
Personal experience of the strategic function at the levels of higher military command has no close substitutes
in the form of educational approaches. There is probably
some value to the military historical tourism known
generically as the staff ride.43 And certainly there is
merit in role playing games of several kinds. But for
the military profession, as for all others, by far the best
education is taught by the successes and especially the
failures of personal practice.
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The military profession frequently does its best to
educate for higher command by manufacturing the
virtual experience of such command in a variety of
educational (and testing) exercises. A mixture of rides,
simulations, historical and hypothetical future case
studies, seminar debates, field exercises with troops,
and deep and wide personal reading, all contribute to
the effort to educate for the practice of strategy.44 There
are limitations as well as strengths inherent in every
one of the components of the strategic educational
process just cited. However, to say this is not to say
anything especially profound or helpful. The methods
noted here are dwarfed in their relative significance
for the education of strategists by these four dominant
factors: nature (biology), personality, experience, and
opportunity. To these imperial four, we must add the
difficult yet vital element of a wise military promotion
and command selection system. It is simply a fact that
politics, broadly defined, is not always a constructive
element in the drive for military effectiveness. Although
failure is widely recognized to be a teacher superior to
success, military establishments are prone to punish
failure. The paradox can be that although a major
general learns his trade in good part by his errors as
a divisional commander, that failure is judged by the
command selection process not as valuable learning
experience, but rather as sufficient proof of unfitness
for corps command. Of course, this is not to suggest
eccentrically that soldiers should be rewarded for
failure. Obviously, some cases of failure in command
will reflect all too accurately an unfitness for the level of
responsibility attained. Every organization, including
military ones, both overpromotes people who shone
in lesser jobs, and terminates or effectively freezes
the careers of people who are not permitted much
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slack in assessment of their current performance. It is
neither useful nor fair to hold military organizations
to a standard of perfection. Mistakes will always be
made. Only in Lake Woebegone are all students above
average.
The problem of education for strategists for the
military profession is two-fold. First, the profession in
a particular country can find itself for many years quite
bereft of true experience in the exercise of its most core
competency, fighting. Second, the strategic function is
almost incomparably more important for professional
soldiers than it is for other walks of life, because national security and human survival are at stake. When
generals make mistakes, casualties ensue additional
to those that are expected statistically (normal for the
event). Furthermore, the whole community is apt to be
placed in peril of several varieties as a consequence of
poor military strategic performance. Early in the 20th
century, it was a cynical French commonplace to quip
that “it takes 20,000 casualties to train a major-general.”
Exaggeration though that may have been, it did make
a necessary point that our current age likes to forget.
It is a regrettable but unavoidable truth of military
strategy that its primary instrument is the fighting
power of its soldiers (however equipped for combat
in whatever geographical environment). Western
society with its decent liberal values teaches its citizens
that every human life is an end in itself. But for the
military strategist, his soldiers are individual pieces
of his instrument, they cannot be valued principally
as human beings whose safety is their commander’s
dominant concern. If the avoidance of casualties is “job
one,” the military instrument will be ineffective at best
and prone to disaster at worst. Happily, there is no real
conflict between a commander’s “duty of care” for his
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men, and his duty to perform his command function.
The latter is conducted in a manner that reflects the
former. Indeed, if the command performance by a
practicing strategist obviously expresses a wholly
uncaring instrumental disregard for his individual
soldiers, he will soon discover that their combat
performance reflects their sense of betrayal.
Plainly, strategic education should strive to be as
realistic as proves feasible. Fortunately for society
but unfortunately for strategic education, on-thejob education for strategy in truly higher military
command under wartime conditions tends to be
relatively rare. On the one hand, most of the world’s
armed forces, most of the time, are not at war. On the
other hand, even when a military establishment is at
war, the number of higher command positions will
always be very few. What this means is that history
provides few opportunities for the people who are
charged with the practice of military strategy to have
a significant quality of directly relevant experience.
Paradoxically, the more effective a military force is
as a peacekeeping deterrent, the less likely it is to be
effective on der Tag for action against specific enemies
in the actual battlespace. Practice rarely makes perfect,
but militaries that do not have to fight are unlikely
to be good, let alone excellent, at first when the key
is turned for war. Peace loving democracies almost
invariably lose the “first fight” for this reason. To
resort to a familiar adventurous analogy, it is probable
that it is at least as difficult to excel as a brain surgeon
as it is to succeed as a military strategist at the highest
level. But whereas the brain surgeon hones his skills
throughout his career, the military strategist does not.45
There is always the distinctive problem of the enemy.
The strategist needs to learn how to win in a rivalry,
a competition, a “duel on a larger scale.”46 Few brains
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(subjects, victims) purposefully devise a cunning plan
to thwart the surgeon’s plan and his performance with
the knife.
We must conclude this part of the discussion
by advising, on the one hand, that it is obviously
true to maintain that superior education for strategy
can only be through its practice. On the other hand,
military institutions are able to provide at least some
educational assistance to those few people whom
nature and personality have equipped to be candidates
for the responsibilities of strategy. But, what should be
taught as strategic education, and why? It is to these
educationally operational topics that this monograph
now turns.
What to Teach?
Above all else, the strategist has need of an
educated capacity for strategic judgment. At its higher
levels, which is to say, where operations must be
conceived, planned, and executed for the purpose of
shaping the whole military course of a war and where
military goals need to be chosen for their anticipated
political consequences, the strategist has to fly largely
by intuition and guesswork. Certainly, what can be
calculated should be calculated, but even supposedly
authoritative metrics often are nothing of the sort. The
strategist and his staff must calculate logistic needs and
logistic availability, but the desperation of necessity
can make some, not all, mockery of standard numbers.
Casualty rates, their impact upon unit cohesion
and morale, and the resulting reduction in combat
effectiveness, can all be modeled and counted, but
frequently they are counted incorrectly. The reason for
this is that several or more factors contribute to human
behavior, and readily PowerPointable elementary
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truths have a long history in the frustration of theory.
For example, although combat power is enabled vitally
by material factors, the immaterial, or moral elements as
an earlier generation expressed it, are more important.
Better men (on the day) with worse weapons will
usually beat worse men with better weapons. Skill and
determination matter more than the latest technology.
There are, of course, practical contextually specific
limits to this mighty truth. The prudent strategist will
hope and strive to command both better men and better
weapons.
Whether or not a person entrusted with strategic
duties will prove capable of discharging them
adequately is always, as noted already, determined
by a mixture of nature, educated nurture, experience,
and opportunity. American history no doubt has
been well stocked with soldiers who would, perhaps
could, have been distinguished strategists, had only
their country called them to that duty. It might be an
instructive exercise to review the fairly bloody history
of the United States and pose the question, “when,
and for how long, did the country need the services of
outstanding strategists?” It is a truth of strategic history
that even talented strategists can only demonstrate such
proficiency as circumstances permit. Some enemies
pose greater challenges than others. Some wartime
contexts impose greater constraints on strategic talent
than others. Political competence in the White House
should provide a wartime playing field for America’s
military strategists that is distinctly uphill for the
country’s foes. Strategy is strategy, but most enemies
of a power as well resourced as the United States
should be defeatable for reasons that need not include
American strategic brilliance. Strategic competence,
shading into excellence, not brilliance, is the practic-
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able goal that should be sought in the performance of
the country’s strategists.
For the limited purpose of this discussion, I am
obliged to assume that the armed forces are competent
in selecting for formal education in strategy those
men and women who are strategically educable.
In addition to their tactical grasp of “soldiering” in
current conditions, which is to say their competent
understanding of the “grammar of war” today,47 I
shall assume also that those selected for the higher
education at issue here are competent and more in the
management, command, and leadership of people.
Somewhat more hesitantly, I need to assume that, in
addition, the aspiring strategists have the physical and
mental robustness and personalities that do not disable
them from effective sustained command performance.
The reason why it is necessary to proffer these terms of
reference is because I need to identify just what a formal
education in strategy might achieve, and what must be
beyond its reach. Academic education cannot provide
absent cognitive capacity, real-world experience
of strategizing with awesome responsibilities, or
a personality that commands respect, trust, and
sometimes even affection. We professors should
recognize our limitations.
Readers are advised that highly though I rank the
value of some academic education in strategy, I am not
misled into the self-flattering belief that we academics
can teach strategy to officially designated strategists so
well that success should be theirs. War and warfare are
too complex to be reducible to an elementary contest
between friendly and enemy skills in strategy. Having
granted this caveat, I will proceed to specify what can
and should be taught in an academic setting, albeit a
setting enlivened with such exposure to the real world
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of relevant mud and blood as inspired teaching methods can offer usefully. The argument here is organized
within the framework of seven major points.
First, students must be encouraged to think
strategically.48 They need to learn to focus upon actions
as enablers of the consequences they seek. They have
to reason as it were instrumentally, to try to anticipate
second-and–beyond order effects. The tactician “does”
for higher—broader, deeper, even distant—ends.
Where military strategy as a coherent component of
grand strategy meets the political world of policy,
strategists have to be able to guess (calculate, intuit?),
what particular intended operational-level military
achievements bring to the big game of the whole
military course of the war. And also, working with
officials on the policy bank of the strategy bridge, the
military strategist must identify the military objectives
that should serve the political goals set by policy as the
purpose of the enterprise. In Clausewitz’s immortal
words, “[t]he political object—the original motive for
the war—will thus determine both the military objective
to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.”49
This simple formula is as logically compelling as it is
fearsomely difficult to apply in practice. In many wars,
if not most, it will be far from self-evident, let alone
calculable, how military achievements would translate
into sufficient political success. Moreover, as we shall
emphasize, it is necessary for would-be strategists to be
educated for a competitive context, one which contains
an enemy, or enemies, with an independent will(s).
To think strategically is to reason ends-waysmeans. Too often in practice, relations among the three
components in the triptych of the strategy function
are not connected as just specified. Fashionable ways
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can drive means and the policy to legitimize them.
Or, favored means may shape ways which drive
ends—for truly multiple pathologies.50 Suffice it to say
that although the educated strategist will appreciate
the potential for some disarrangement of the three
elements, he will not be confused about the necessity
for there to be tolerably coherent relations among them.
Those ill-educated in strategy are liable to confuse ends,
ways, and means, or at least are likely to be misled into
strategic error by permitting the pressing demands of
the instrument of war to dominate its purpose.
For an especially blatant historical example of a
perilous misuse of concepts, consider the difficulty of
thinking strategically about so-called Strategic Forces.
When a military instrument itself is collapsed into
its consequences what tends to be the result is what
has been called the “tacticization of strategy.”51 In the
1960s, the irony was widely noted that U.S. tactical
airpower functioned allegedly strategically against the
territory of North Vietnam, while the quintessentially
supposedly strategic B-52s of the Strategic Air Command performed tactical “Arc Light” strikes in the
south. The trouble with such linguistic conceptual
misuse and abuse is that it encourages dysfunctional
thinking, planning, and behavior. When the United
States has forces that it titles “strategic,” what does
it mean for forces that lack that once fashionable and
prized label? Is the U.S. Army inherently nonstrategic?
How can any among the elements that comprise
the U.S. armed forces be other than strategic in the
consequences of their threat or use? The student who is
able to think strategically about landpower is enabled
thereby to think strategically about any form of military
power. An education in strategy must be founded upon
a rock solid grasp of the intimate desirable relations
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among ends, ways, and means, and he should be able
to detect undue slighting of one component in favor of
the others. Policy without matching ways and means is
mere vanity, while absent policy, actions by ways with
available means has to be pointless.
Second, some formal education in strategic theory
is desirable for all aspiring strategists. Nonetheless,
there will usually be someone who has no need of
book learning on strategy; a person who knows what
Clausewitz should have written, even if he did not
quite write it—insofar as one can tell across language,
culture, and time. However, exposure to the classics
typically does no harm, even to those whose natural
endowments and learning from long experience
might render such an exercise redundant. Few among
history’s greater strategists might not have improved
their performances had they been better educated. It is
a safe assumption that everyone whose future duties
could be intelligently tagged as strategic should benefit
from the education achieved by others. The others in
this case are by widespread assent the most perceptive
among those who have ever sought to understand and
explain war and warfare. Because statecraft and war
have not changed their natures over the millennia, the
very few true classics of strategy are works that by
definition must speak meaningfully for our time, as
they do for all others.52 If we can assume, as we must,
that the contemporary would-be strategist is tactically
a master of his profession, and what he does not know
he can readily find out, it is evident that his education
in strategy need not be tied to any particular historical
strategic context. In point of fact, it is probably
desirable that his educators in strategy divert him
from current and future topics of concern. Speaking on
February 22, 1947, at Princeton University, Secretary
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of State General George C. Marshall proffered the
opinion that he doubted “whether a man can think
with full wisdom and with deep convictions regarding
certain of the basic international issues today who has
not at least reviewed in his mind the period of the
Peloponnesian War and the Fall of Athens.”53 Whether
or not the general overstated his case, nonetheless, it
was a powerful case worthy of overstatement. Since
statecraft and war have changed only their character,
but not their nature, over the centuries, it has to follow
that a common general theory of strategy should apply
to all historical examples of the phenomena. A prime
source of the benefit of learning grand and military
strategy from Pericles of Athens and King Archidamus
of Sparta—courtesy of Thucydides—has to be the
distance in detail from the student’s military culture.
To be educated in strategy via such instructive and
bloody episodes as Athens’ Sicilian Expedition of 415413 BCE, or Napoleon’s adventure in Russia in 1812,
avoids the danger of military institutional or national
parochialism and bias that is apt to intrude upon the
contemplation of contemporary issues.
Third, although education in strategy must have as
its backbone a general theory that is both timeless and
universal in authority, strategy is a practical subject,
and its executors must learn how to employ that
theory for its current value. General theory advises the
practicing strategist about the structure and working
of his professional function. But, following Clausewitz
closely, I must insist that such education can only teach
the strategist how to approach his duties as strategist,
it cannot instruct or train in the contemporary content,
the officer himself must provide for the classic ideas to
fit the specific context.54 Possible illustrative examples
abound. Center(s) of gravity (COG) is a powerful
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notion that militaries are apt to find irresistible, and
for some good reasons.55 But rarely is this contestable
idea entirely beyond dispute as to its nature, character,
precise location(s), and relevance to the strategic
challenge of the day. Only contemporary assessment of
context can determine the identity of the most relevant
COG. And only contextual analysis is able to reveal
whether it is advisable, or even feasible, to menace the
enemy’s COG.
The strategic educator is obliged most strictly to
distinguish strategic general theory (singular), from
the concrete historical specifics that have to shape and
drive plans and strategies (plural) for the actual practice
of strategy. Considered in the abstract by categories,
there is nothing in 21st century statecraft and warfare
that did not exist in the 5th century BCE. The relative
significance of every dimension to strategy will alter
from period to period, war to war, and even month to
month in the same war. For example, the commanders
of an army proud of its maneuverist dexterity may
discover that geography and logistics can trump
operational military skill. The German Army in Russia
(Ostheer) in 1941 tried successfully to educate the
future soldiers of all nations in the realities of supply
and movement as limitations to operational ambition.
The educator in strategic theory is neither a
philosopher in the search of truth for its own sake, nor
is he promoting ideas in contradistinction to action.
Strategic theory and purposeful strategic practice are
indissolubly connected. The military planner is, ipso
facto, a theorist. A plan is a theory specifying how a
particular goal might be secured, ceteris paribus. Until
the course of future events unfolds, the chief planner
and the commander, who may be one and the same
person, are deciding and acting only on the basis of
a theory of success. Because even classic theorists of
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strategy have been known to weave in their literary
narratives among what today we know as policy,
strategy, operations, and tactics, strategic education
has to be alert to the ever present necessity to distinguish between the continuities and the discontinuities
in strategic history. Great abstract ideas—such as
war’s trinitarian nature, friction, COG, and many
others—always need translation in detail for today,
as well as proper comprehension, of course. It follows
that although strategic debaters can hardly avoid
argument by purported historical analogy, so critical
to useful applicability is the detail of context that
alleged evidence by illustration must be virus-checked
for lethally inappropriate anachronism.
Fourth, wherever strategic education may fall
short, prominent among the more harmful of its
potential areas of neglect would be a failure to
emphasize the pervasive importance of the enemy.
Underappreciation of the inherently competitive
nature of a strategic context probably has been
the most damaging source of poor to catastrophic
historical strategic performance. The leading source
for the paradox and irony that Edward N. Luttwak so
brilliantly exposes as being central to the very nature
of strategy is the presence of an independent, indeed
interdependent, player on the field—the enemy.56
Luttwak draws suitable attention to the necessity of
understanding the enemy; a good practice that has
been valid since earliest times. Sun-tzu, Thucydides,
and Clausewitz, were all eloquent in their several
ways on the subject of the importance of trying to
know the enemy. It is easily understandable, though it
is not readily forgivable, for military texts to have little
to say about the competitive nature of war, warfare
(and statecraft). With his central focus on paradox in

45

strategy, Luttwak is unique among the classic theorists
of strategy in treating the subject of war as a duel with
the full seriousness that it merits. Indeed, if anything,
his analysis may risk overstatement. Even an excellent
idea, a truly penetrating insight, can be overworked.
As usual in all matters strategic, good advice tends
to conceal real danger. It is necessary for soldiers to
be bold, but not reckless. It is essential to respect the
enemy, but not to stand in awe of him. In Korea in 1950,
General Douglas MacArthur was bold at Inchon, but
reckless in his drive to the Yalu. In the Western desert of
North Africa in 1941-42, a succession of British generals
and their troops came not merely to respect German
General Erwin Rommel, rather they expected to be
beaten by him. A classic wholly American example of
this peril was the ill-effect on the morale of the Union’s
Army of the Potomac and its leaders of Robert E. Lee’s
well-merited reputation as a general who won his
battles.57 Confederate soldiers in the Army of Northern
Virginia expected to win, and—prior to Gettysburg—
their opponents anticipated defeat.
For the strategic educator, it is a challenge to know
where general wisdom on warfare ends and local
contextual variation begins. While there should be no
argument over the significance of an other whose locally
encultured mind is the object of our military (inter
alia) effort, there is major scope for dispute over what
should be regarded simply as universal best practice
in the military context. To illustrate for clarity, would
we anticipate Vietnamese irregular fighters waging
their warfare in a notably Oriental, even Vietnamese–
Oriental manner? Or, rather, in the same way any
intelligent and well-motivated belligerent would
behave in a similar context and situation?58 Today’s
strategic educators need to beware lest inadvertently
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they miseducate, even if for excellent, though in
context harmful, reasons. We know that every war is
different, but how different is that? The classic texts
on COIN can and must be taught for their enduring
wisdom. But, failure to adapt Galula, Thompson, and
now Kilcullen, to new contexts, most especially to new
enemies, must fuel the prospects for strategic failure in
the future.59 Directly put, today’s field-grade officers
may be educated by their own command experience, an
experience reinforced by new teaching in war colleges,
to misunderstand the unforeseeable historical strategic
challenges of COIN in the 2010s and beyond. War can
move on more rapidly than fashion in the content of
military education.
Fifth, as a separate item it is necessary for this
monograph to highlight the significance of a skeptical,
though not cynical, mindset as a strategic asset. This
can be difficult to achieve, because although the
experience of a lively military career should provide
ample fuel for skepticism on the part of the successful
soldier, the personality requirements for effective
command can neutralize a healthy skepticism. By this
I mean to suggest that a successful general is most
likely to be one who is, or certainly who appears to
be, self-confident. Skepticism is a crowning virtue
in a philosopher. But we do not want our soldiers
to be philosophers. To take action in the face of
war’s systemic uncertainty, to take chances with
many men’s lives, and especially to adhere to a plan
when evidence of its possible unsoundness begins
to accumulate—all these features, and many more,
require the strategist-commander to be resolute,
determined, and occasionally to turn a blind eye to
orders from the fainter-hearted. All of that granted,
still it is necessary for this monograph to register a
vote for skepticism as a vital component in strategic
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education. The on-going, ever-renewed, American
defense debate, in common with the debates in other
defense communities, is prone to overpersuasion by
apparent novelty in strategic ideas and methods. One
must say “apparent,” because generically there are no
new ideas and methods in strategy and warfare. The
classical canon of strategic texts contains, and repeats,
them all. However, the U.S. defense community, with
its multitude of stakeholder interests, its genuinely
global challenges, and its awesome array of conceptual,
organizational, technical, tactical, logistic, and social,
issues—to specify only some of the categories—
positively invites the marketing of novelty. Of course,
just because the latest new idea lurks underappreciated
in the pages of Sun-tzu, this does not mean that an
old idea is not new to a strategically poorly educated
audience that is vulnerable to seduction by a slick
PowerPoint presentation. The strategist should be
a creative thinker. But as Antulio Echevarria argues,
“critical thinking is far more important to achieving a
successful transformation than is creative imaginative
thinking.”60 One could add that the better critical
strategist might even dare to question whether
transformation is desirable.
The argument here amounts simply to caveat
emptor. What goes around, comes around. Bad ideas
are certain to return in the next-but-one (or two, three,
or four) strategic debate. An education in strategy
worthy of the name helps significantly to inoculate
aspiring strategists against hasty capture by ideas that
have a less than glittering historical record, no matter
how distant that record may be. It is not to be doubted,
however, that a poor idea in one historical context can
be a good idea in another. For an obvious example,
it would be absurd to purport to promulgate some
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general wisdom about the proper relationship between
ground power and air power, regardless of political,
geographical, and technological, contexts.61 The value
of air power varies with terrain, weather, technology,
and military-strategic circumstances. This fifth point
is intended to reinforce the most central argument of
this work; the claim that the overriding mission of an
education in strategy has to be the enhancement of
the strategist’s ability to exercise judgment. For this
essential function, he requires knowledge, especially
historical understanding, of what succeeded and failed
in which circumstances in the past, and why. Because
it is a pragmatic project, strategic competence, let alone
excellence, is a matter not only of recognizing ideas
and methods that have high promise. Competence is
at least as much a matter of being able to judge which
ideas and methods appear to be fit enough for the
purposes of the day.
For a closing word on skepticism, though one that
strays unmistakeably into outright cynicism, I quote
these words from the perceptive British novelist of
military follies, Derek Robinson:
Your problem is you’re personally offended when you
discover a cock-up. Believe me, there’s always a cock-up.
It’s in the nature of war. Whoever said truth is the first
casualty arrived late on the scene. The first casualty of
war is the plan. . . . The first plan always fails. Usually
the second plan does, often the third too. Then, with a
bit of luck, the next plan works, and we win. That’s my
experience.62

Sixth, the advisability of an active capacity for
skepticism needs to be balanced by a confidence that it
is possible for the strategist and his strategy to function
well enough for its task. To venture into dangerously
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complex terrain, I shall hazard the thought that the
same skepticism that can be destructive of recognition
of merit and of resolution, also serves in a vital critical
role. Ideas, and ideas as plans, need to be interrogated
for their strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, there
are many situations in statecraft, war, and warfare,
when the skeptical faculty illuminates a high danger
of failure in every discernible option. In such a context,
the strategist simply must benefit from the skepticism
that alerts him to peril, and choose the course of action
that in his judgment offers the best odds when danger
and opportunity are compared and estimated. Strategic
education has to inform the student about the argument
advanced by some scholars, soldiers, and novelists,
to the effect that strategy is impossible; allegedly it
is an illusion.63 That argument has some superficial
plausibility, but it collapses definitively under the
empirical weight of historical evidence. Strategy can be
done and has been done, notwithstanding the myriad
of impediments to its performance. An education in
strategy most emphatically is not a foolish education
in the impossible. Astrology is an example of nonsense,
strategy is not.
Seventh, a strategic education should include
an education in what today we know as the liberal
arts. More broadly still, there seems to this strategic
theorist to be some, though only some, significant
correlations historically between educationally wellrounded people and outstanding performance in
the higher realms of strategy. A narrow military
competence can suffice, but there are good reasons
why such must place the soldier under a heavy burden
of inadequacy. To be specific, the strategist has no
choice but to communicate with the political world,
the realm whither policy guidance flows. Ideally, and
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notwithstanding the civil-military distinction that was
so excellently overstated by Samuel P. Huntington,
the very senior soldier should be able to explain the
actual and prospective military story to professional
politicians and civilian officials in a way that they can
comprehend.64 The soldier-strategist owes it to his
army and country to explain the military context so
that policy is shaped realistically. Many senior soldiers
have had personalities adequate and more for the rise
to the stratosphere of their profession, only to find that
they could not be effective in communicating outside
the military family. When this occurs, there is a danger
that politicians will hire and fire military chiefs until
they locate the men that seem to be suitably empathetic,
or at least with whom some genuine dialog is possible.
Even with good will on both sides, which is to say
with a sincere intention to collaborate constructively,
the strategic function which must be shared by soldierstrategists and politician-strategists is extremely
difficult to perform well enough. A liberally educated
soldier is more likely to be able to reach a civilian
audience than is one whose enculturation has been
limited to the necessities of his military duties. To be
able to offer prudent military advice, senior soldiers
have need of some political and social-cultural, as well
as strategic, sense. It should go without saying, but
I will say it anyway, that an educated strategist is a
person who both possesses, and on occasion consults
and is known to consult, a moral compass.
Conclusion.
This monograph suggests a legion of ideas, claims,
and arguments, that might so warrant the stamp of
authorial self-approval as to be itemized as conclusions.
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Rather than offer recommendations as such, I choose
instead to be content to recommend seven points to the
reader for his consideration.
1. True strategic genius is rare indeed. Fortunately,
the country usually has need only of strategic talent.
The latter can be improved by some formal education
in strategy conducted by institutions charged with that
purpose; the former most probably cannot be enhanced,
though it might be tamed. If anything, there could be
a danger that formal education might blunt a talent of
genius that is gifted by nature and has been honed by
the opportunities granted by experience. One has to
acknowledge that there is a sense in which strategic
genius is what genius does, and that involves creative
insight, strategic coup d’oeil, that cannot significantly be
the product of the classroom.
2. Happily, the country can survive and prosper
even without unarguable, though almost inevitably
eccentric, even roguish, strategic genius. Instead,
it requires the services of strategists who are good
enough, who are “fit for purpose” as the saying goes.
Just how challenging that purpose will be must vary
with the details of historical context. A well-constructed
curriculum and a wise mix of educational methods,
certainly is able to teach what can be taught in order to
help educate those who are educable in strategy.
3. Because good, not necessarily excellent, strategic
performance requires some qualities in people that
are extraneous to strictly intellectual understanding,
there are aspects of strategy that cannot be taught.
That granted, still there is much that can and has to
be taught, not least because nearly everyone who has
a genuine instinct for the sound higher conduct of
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war—and there are few of these—can benefit from a
little help.
4. The help that formal strategic education offers
includes the aid to reasoning that is on offer in the
classical canon of writings by those authors that
by effectively universal consent have thought most
deeply and perceptively about the subject. The wouldbe strategists of today cannot help but benefit from
reading (with understanding) Clausewitz, Sun-tzu,
and Thucydides, for the most sacred of authorial icons
in the strategic canon, even, sometimes especially,
when they disagree with their arguments.
5. The strategist’s responsibility is awesomely
difficult in good part because it is so inclusive in its
required domain. The strategist must strive to provide
a purposeful coherence to the realm of policy and
tactics. The key to strategic sense may sound so obvious
as to be banal when it is made explicit, as here. The
strategist needs to be able to exercise sound strategic
judgment. By that I mean no more and no less than the
ability to juggle, perhaps manage and guide, creatively
and coherently the practice of the strategic function
which comprises the pursuit of ends, by suitable ways,
employing appropriate means. At its highest level, the
strategist has to attempt to orchestrate military and
other behavior for desired political consequences.
This is an inherently enormous challenge in currency
conversion from military coin to political coin. Some
education in strategic history cannot train a person
regarding best practice for his historically unique
strategic problems. But that education assuredly can
educate today’s strategist as to the kinds of behaviors
that succeeded and failed in particular categories
of a given situation. Although there is no historical
permanence in details, there is much permanence in
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the nature of strategic contexts. This is why the classics
of strategy continue to have far more than mere
antiquarian value.
6. Unbloodied and unmuddied by military
experience, civilian would-be educators in strategy
are potentially highly vulnerable to the fallacy of
overintellectual “strategism.” By this I mean that they
are persuaded that strategy and its performance is
largely an intellectual matter. They are at least halfcorrect. Strategy does have a significant intellectual
dimension. Moreover, even when strategic judgment
may seem more instinctual than intellectual, it is
probably the case that the superior instinct was at least
sharpened, and its operation may have been triggered,
by ideas from a strategic classic that lodged in the
brain in deep reserve against the call of a mercifully
rare necessity. Because strategy is a pragmatic subject,
it must be approached and performed via a coherently
constructive fusion of relevant theory and practice.
Strategy implies both a theory, including theory-asplan, and performance: It has to be done.
7. The final point is cautionary. Those who would
educate in and for strategy are ever vulnerable to another sin of “strategism.” This is the belief that the key to
America’s prospects for success in this and that venture
is sound strategy. I am prone episodically to capture
by this fallacy. It is well to remember that although
poor or absent strategy is likely to sink any military
enterprise, great or small, it is by no means alone in
such important status. It should be obvious that faulty
policy is apt to be more lethal than is weak strategy.
Or, what if policy ends are well chosen while strategic
ways seem suitable, but, alas, the military and other
means are tactically incapable of the needed perform-
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ance in the field and on the day? Plainly, performance
of the strategic function depends upon both the political
purpose and the actions of the military members of the
national security team.
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